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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the microfoundations of how 
non-experts’ (or general public) form inflation expectations. Using a unique 
dataset we investigate the range of near rational inflation expectations.  An 
important contribution to understanding how non-experts form their 
expectations is ‘sticky information expectations’, specifically the 
epidemiological model.  Our analysis uses an extended version of the 
epidemiological model. We find that the general public are best depicted as 
those who are either information gathers or inattentive. In addition, the 
inattentive general public can be either forward-looking or ‘stubborn’, that 
is persistent.  
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I: Introduction: 
 While the inflation expectations of non-experts, especially that of the general public, form 
a crucial part of price and wage-setting behavior and macroeconomic models, understanding how 
they form their expectations is less well understood. Nevertheless, increasingly there is a general 
consensus that agents’ expectations are less than rational. For example, the discussion in Mankiw et 
al (2004) states clearly that “there is a large middle ground between adaptive and hyperrational 
expectations, and that their paper is an attempt to explore one possible alternative” (p. 270). In an 
earlier study, Roberts (1997) had concluded that inflation expectations are less than perfectly 
rational. In a later paper Roberts (1998) presented inflation expectation, specified as a partial 
adjustment model, which was termed of ‘stubborn’ expectations. The expressed intention of the 
present paper is to explore the range of near rational household expectations using a unique dataset.  
 An important recent theory explaining how non-experts form their expectations is ‘rational 
inattentive behavior’. Reis (2006a and 2006b) argue that both consumers and producers update their 
information set sporadically. Producers do not continuously update their production plans but 
choose a price for their output and an optimal time at which to be inattentive, that is they receive no 
news about the economy until it is time to plan again. Similarly, time constrained consumers 
optimize their utility and undertake consumption decisions infrequently. The slow diffusion of 
information among the population is due to the costs of acquiring information as well as the costs of 
reoptimization, resulting in the ‘sticky-information expectations’. Based on the notion of ‘sticky-
information expectations’ (or rational inattentive behavior), Carroll (2003 and 2006) provide 
specific microfoundations of how households form their macroeconomic expectations referring to it 
as ‘epidemiological expectations’.  
 Importantly, the models concur that the non-experts remain forward-looking even in the 
face of imperfect information. In periods they are able to receive current news or information, and 
in the case of epidemiological expectations these are the professional forecasts, they are able to 
form their expectations rationally. In other periods, they have to rely on old news but, nevertheless, 
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remain forward-looking. Carroll (2003) through a number of crucial assumptions painstakingly 
shows that the inattentive households remain forward-looking; even though the ensuing empirical 
analysis uses lagged one-year ahead forecasts to proxy the forward-looking inattentive household 
expectations.  
 In the current paper we present a model which extends the epidemiological expectations 
model, focusing on the nature of inattentive agents. Similar to the rational inattentive literature, 
non-expert agents are divided into those that are either ‘information gathers’ or ‘inattentive’. The 
‘inattentive’ agents are further separated into those that are either ‘forward-looking’ or simply 
‘stubborn’. Following Roberts (1998), the term ‘stubborn’ expectation is used to depict agents 
whose expectations are persistent.  ‘Information gathers’ update their expectations by absorbing the 
inflation expectations of professional forecasters. We also consider those households that update 
expectations based on recently available actual inflation rates.   
 The next section re-states the epidemiological model relaxing the crucial assumptions 
made in Carroll (2003) while also adapting it to the available dataset. Crucially, we also extend the 
epidemiological model to allow the inattentive households to be either forward-looking or stubborn. 
Section III discusses the survey-based dataset and undertakes the empirical investigations and, 
finally, the concluding remarks are drawn. In brief, we conclude that approximately sixty percent of 
the general public are inattentive and of whom fifty percent are found to be ‘stubborn’. This has 
direct implications for actual inflation dynamics, especially the ‘sticky-information’ inflation.  
 
 II: The Model: 
 Consider the basic premise of the epidemiological version of ‘sticky information 
expectations’ as expressed in Carroll (2003) as follows: 
 ...}][)(1(][){1(][][ 121111   tttttttt NNNM    (1) 
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where ][ 1ttM   denotes households’ inflation forecasts for t+1 made in t, and ][ 1ttN   are the 
corresponding professional forecasts as they are reported by news media in t. A proportion of 
households (or population) ( ) are information-gathers and observe the current newspapers’ 
forecast of inflation, which report the professional forecasts. The remaining households ( 1 ) are 
inattentive, but retain or follow the previous period’s two-period ahead forecasts. Indeed, inattentive 
households use a combination of multi-period ahead forecasts made in the past for the period t+1 
when forming their current inflation forecasts. So, while the inattentive households have to rely on 
previous forecasts due to a lack of current information, they are, most importantly, still forward-
looking as suggested by their use of two-period and multi-period ahead forecasts. When forecasts 
are made in each quarter, the quarterly one-year ahead forecasts are represented as: 
  ][)1(][][ 4,14,4,   ttttttttt MNM      (2) 
where ][ 4, tttM   denotes households’ inflation forecasts made in t for the quarters from t to t+4 (i.e. 
over one year since quarter t), ][ 4, tttN   are the corresponding professional forecasts as published 
via the news media, and ][ 4,1  tttM   are the inattentive households’ forecasts made in the previous 
quarter (t-1) over the same horizon (i.e. from t to t+4).  
 At this point, Carroll (2003) makes a crucial assumption: permanent innovation to the 
fundamental rate of inflation ( ) is unforecastable beyond the next quarter:   
 00][ 1  nF ntt           (3) 
Under assumption (3) inattentive households inflation forecast depend only on the information set 
available in the period when the forecast is made and not on its horizon, provided that the number 
of quarters to be predicted is the same. Therefore, any forecast (F) made in t-1 for any future period 
of four quarters (i.e. over the one year) over any horizon is the same, i.e.: ][ 3,11  tttF   = 
][ 4,1  tttF   = ][ 5,11  tttF   = ][ 6,21  tttF   = ][ 7,31  tttF   and so on. Consequently, equation (2) is 
denoted as: 
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  ][)1(][][ 3,114,4,   ttttttttt MNM      (4) 
where ][ 3,11  tttM   is the one-year ahead forecast formed in t-1, that is the lagged dependent 
variable. Based on this crucial assumption, the inattentive household forecasts, though stubborn or 
persistent, are consistent with forward-looking behavior. 
 In the present dataset, households are asked not only to make a one-year ahead forecast on 
a quarterly basis, where they forecast inflation over the forthcoming year (i.e. the next four quarters 
ahead), but they are also asked to make two-year ahead forecasts for the subsequent year (i.e. 
between four and eight quarters ahead). Therefore, the epidemiological model can be alternatively 
stated as follows: 
  )(.....)}1(][){1(][][ 7,314,4,    ttttttttt FFM  
  ][)1(][][ 7,314,4,   ttttttttt MSM       (5) 
where ][][ 4,4,   tttttt NS   denotes the mean of the surveyed professional forecasts which are 
reported by the news media. Now the rational households will form their year ahead forecasts based 
on current news, and the inattentive ones will form their forecasts based on their previous period’s 
two-year ahead forecasts; therefore, both rational and inattentive households are forward-looking.  
 In order to ensure that inattentive agents display just forward-looking behavior, we need to 
relax assumption (3) and allow the permanent innovation to be forecastable beyond the forthcoming 
year or next four quarters, i.e.  0][ 7,31  tttF  , and: ][][][ 7,313,117,31   ttttttttt FFF  . Of 
course, if assumption (3) is valid, models (4) and (5) tend to coincide, as ][][ 7,314,1   tttttt MM  .1 
If it is not valid, an unresolved question is: what does the inattentive households expectations 
represent in Carroll’s epidemiological model?  
                                                 
1 Given that underlying forecasts made in t-1 are the same (i.e. ][][ 7,314,1   tttttt FF  ), also their observable 
components might be very similar.  
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 A possible explanation is the inattentive households could be distinguished between those 
that display either purely forward-looking or stubborn (or persistent) behavior. Forward-looking 
households use their two (or multi)-year ahead forecasts from the previous period. Those inattentive 
households who rely on their lagged one-year ahead forecasts are simply stubborn, as defined in 
Roberts (1998): their inflation expectations ‘are “stubborn” because adjust gradually to their 
“rational” value.’ (pp. 5). Also, arguing that an interpretation of the stubborn expectations is the 
habit persistence in inflation expectations. Therefore, the inattentive agents in model (5) can be 
extended as follows:   
 ])[)1(][)(1(][][ 7,313,114,4,   tttttttttttt MMSM   (6) 
where  is the proportion of inattentive households (or population) that are stubborn, and the 
remainder ( 1 ) are forward-looking. The remainder of the paper empirically investigates the 
issues raised in this section.   
III: Empirical Analysis 
The data used in the empirical analysis are quarterly data compiled by Barclays Basix based 
on surveys of various sections of the UK population about their expected inflation rate over the 
period 1986Q4-2005Q1. Since 2005Q1 they abandoned collecting the relevant information at a 
disaggregate level and just focused on the ‘general public’. The available dataset reports the mean 
forecasts for both the professional forecasts, or business economist (be), and general public (gp) but 
not the individual forecasts. 
The professionals surveyed are simply asked their expectations of RPI: 
“Can you tell me what you expect the rate of inflation to be over the next twelve months?” 
The members of the general public, on the other hand, are specifically asked2: 
                                                 
2 Clearly, the surveyed members of the general public are given specific choice for their inflation forecasts and, 
therefore, lead by the surveyor. Interestingly, if the general public learns from professional forecasters via the news 
media as found in Carroll (2003 and 2006), such a format would only serve to jog their memory.    
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“From this list, can you tell me what you expect the rate of inflation to be over the next 12 
months? ‘below zero’, ‘about 1%’, ‘about 2%’ , …,’about 10%’, ‘above 10%’, ‘don’t 
know’.” 
These represent the one- year ahead forecasts of both professionals ( ][ 4, tttS  ) and households 
( ][ 4, tttM  ). Both agents are then asked: 
Q2. And how about the following twelve months?  
And this represents the respective two-year ahead forecasts ( ][ 8,4  tttS  and ][ 8,4  tttM  ).  
For the present purpose, the Barclays Basix survey has two key advantages. Firstly, the 
survey includes both the professional and general public forecast of inflation rates. Other studies 
have had to rely on more than one source for the relevant information. For example studies for the 
US use separate surveys (with different timing of data collection) from Michigan SRC for the 
general public and SPF for the professional’s forecasts. Secondly - and more importantly - the 
Barclays Basix survey asks agents to simultaneously provide both a one-year and two-year ahead 
forecasts for inflation.  
If assumption (3) is valid, we expect that the difference between households two- and one-
year ahead forecasts of inflation ( ][][ 4,8,4   tttttt MM  ) to be close to zero. Figure 1 plots the 
forecasts difference for the general public (gp) and business economists (be), i.e. 
][][ 4,8,4   tttttt SS  ).3  
Figure 1 here 
Both differences are persistently non-zero and are also characterized by large swings, suggesting the 
presence of near unit-root data generation processes. Visual inspection of Figure 1 is corroborated 
                                                 
3 The zero-horizontal line visualises what would be the realisation of Carroll’s assumption on the unforecastability over 
horizons larger than one-quarter ahead, while the two vertical lines split the entire sample period – from 1986q4 to 
2005q1 – in three subsamples corresponding to important events: (1) the period up to 1992q3 that corresponds to the 
UK’s participation in the ERM regime, characterized by large inflation volatility; (2) the period from 1992q4 to 1997q3 
of stable inflation with inflation targeting (with interest rate decisions made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer); and 
(3) the period since 1997q4 that covers the phase of explicit inflation targeting under an independent Bank of England. 
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by the univariate statistics reported in Table 1. The unit-root tests never reject the null of non-
stationary levels for both the series.  
Table 1 here 
The autocorrelation coefficients of levels are always significantly positive suggesting that the 
forecasts of permanent innovations are largely unrevised from quarter to quarter. Autocorrelation 
coefficients of the first differences are close to zero and only occasionally significant. In particular, 
the autocorrelation coefficient for the first difference of gp inflation forecasts is significant only in 
the short-run (up to four lags); suggesting that gp forecasts of future permanent innovations are 
similar in consecutive quarterly forecasts. As far as be forecasts are concerned, the difference 
between two- and one-year ahead inflation forecasts is a random walk process. The evidence 
indicates clearly that agents can formulate non-zero forecasts for permanent innovations beyond the 
next period and, in doing so, it invalidates assumption (3)  
In order to model the stylized facts outlined in Section II, we modify Carroll (2003 and 
2006) epidemiological expectations, i.e. model (2). In the first instances following Lanne et al 
(2009) and Brazier et al (2008) we include the naive household’s rule-of-thumb ( t ): 
ttttttttttt MSM    34,124,14, ][][][      (7) 
where i , i=1, 2, and 3 denotes the proportion (or share) of the population, respectively: rational 
(observes professional forecasts contemporaneously ( ][ 4, tttS  )); inattentive (uses the last periods 
two step ahead forecasts ( ][ 4,1  tttM  )); and naive (forecasts inflation using the most recently 
known rate t , i.e. the growth rate of prices in the first month of quarter t with respect to the 
corresponding month of the previous year). In model (7), the explanatory variable ][ 4,1  tttM   is 
not observable. In the present case, due to the availability of the gp’s two-years ahead forecast, we 
assume that ][ 4,1  tttM   = ][ 7,31  tttM  , and obtain the following specification:  
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 ttttttttttt uMSM    37,3124,14, ][][][     (8) 
where 2  is the proportion of forward-looking inattentive households who use their two-year ahead 
prediction made in t-1, ][ 7,31  tttM  , and tu  is the error term.  
 Figure 2 plots the four variables found in model (8). There is evidence of non-stationarity 
and possibly non constant variability over time (detailed tests are available upon request).  
Figure 2 here 
The respective columns in Table 2 report the results of alternative estimators which are consistent 
with stochastic trends and possible autoregressive conditional heteroschedasticity. 
Table 2 here 
The main results may be summarized as follows. All the estimated relationships are cointegrated. 
The sum of the rational, naïve and inattentive households’ shares are never significantly different 
from one, while intercepts are never significant. Approximately 30% of the general public form 
their expectations absorbing the professionals’ forecasts perfectly, while over half the general 
public are inattentive and the remaining are naïve ‘rule-of-thumbers’. The business economist one-
year ahead forecast is weakly exogenous (see CVAR column) and, therefore, does not have to be 
simultaneously modeled with gp inflation forecast in the vector error-correction framework. 
Consequently, the single-equation error-correction specification for gp inflation forecasts 
conditional on (exogenous) be forecasts and actual inflation is a valid reduction of the multivariate 
framework (see also Easaw and Golinelli (2010)). The alternative i coefficient estimates reported 
in Table 2 proximate each other. They represent the different long-run shares of the various 
households within a long-run cointegrated relationship. These results support the forward-looking 
nature of Carroll’s epidemiological model.  
As assumption (3) in Carroll (2003) is not fulfilled (as indicated by our results above), we 
now consider the modified new specification (8). This specification ( ][][ 7,314,1   tttttt MM  ) is a 
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better measure of the unobservable forward-looking regressor than that suggested by Carroll 
( ][][ 3,114,1   tttttt MM  ) - at least the forecast horizon is consistent with forward-looking 
behavior.   
We argued in preceding section that inattentive households could be distinguished between 
those that are forward-looking ( )1(  ), while updating their expectations using  their two-years 
ahead expectations, and those that are simply stubborn ( ): 
][)1(][][ 7,313,114,1   ttttttttt MMM       (9) 
By substituting model (9) into (7) we obtain the general estimable formulation: 
   tttttttttttttt MMSM    37,313,1124,14, ][)1(][][][   (10) 
The above specification nests both the original Carroll (2003) model and modified model (8). 
Therefore, we can test which model better approximates the data. If the null hypothesis 0  is not 
rejected, the best way to measure inattentive people expectations is to use lags of the two-years 
ahead expected inflation, as suggested in model (8). While under the alternative 0  there is at 
least a segment of the inattentive population who are "stubborn". 
 The estimates of model (10) are reported in Table 3 below. Column (1) reports the estimates 
of model (10) where   parameter is ex ante restricted to be zero. This enables us to use the results 
in the first column as a benchmark for the unrestricted estimates of model (10) reported in 
remaining five columns. The upper panel of Table 3 reports estimates which allow for conditional 
heteoskedastic GARCH errors, and the lower panel estimates are obtained from a Cointegrated 
VAR (CVAR) model. These results are also robust using other estimators (i.e. OLS and FM-OLS) 
but, due to brevity, are not reported here and are available upon request.  
Table 3 here 
Despite restricting 0 , the estimated results for model (10) mimics model (8). The estimates 
outlined in the upper and lower part of the first column in Table 3 differ only slightly to the 
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corresponding results reported for model (8) in the first (GARCH) and last (CVAR) columns of 
Table 2. All the estimates reported in Table 3 restrict the intercept to zero, as it was never 
significant in Table 2. The proximity of the estimates in Table 2 with those in the first column of 
Table 3 suggests the irrelevance of the intercept in our models.  
In all cases the GARCH estimated residuals' diagnostics (reported in the upper panel) never 
rejects the null of white noise errors, while CVAR estimates statistics in the lower panel (more 
appropriate for non-stationary variables) always find a cointegration rank of one. We also find weak 
exogeneity for the respective professionals’ forecast (this point will be elaborated further below). 
The second column in Table 3 outlines the results when the restriction 0  is relaxed. The 
estimated   is between 0.43-0.46 and is also always significantly different to both zero and one. 
This result indicates categorically that the combination of the two alternative measures of 
inattentive inflation forecasts better explains the general public’s inflation expectations than that 
suggested in Carroll (2003), and in model (8)4. More interestingly, in model (10) the share of 
information gathers (1) remains more or less the same as that in model (8) – that is around 30-35% 
depending on the estimation method, while 2 increases (from 45-55% to 58-62%) and 3 decreases 
(from 22-23% to 15-16%). This suggests clearly that a better depiction or specification of the 
inattentive general public increases their estimated share at the expenses of that of the naive 
households.  
 Both the first and the second column in Table 3 are labeled as be because we proxy 
professional forecasts with those of the business economists group (as in Table 2).  However, it 
could be argued that the be forecasts may be somewhat different to that reported in the news. For 
instances, in the literature when using US data, the expectations reported in the news are proxies of 
the inflation expectations recorded in the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), while 
                                                 
4 The finding of ‘stubbornness’ in inflation expectations is consistent with other recent analysis. For instances, 
Blanchflower and Kelly (2008) using survey data and Goecke et al (2011) and Pfajfar and Zakelj (2009) using an 
experimental approach find that households’ expectations are stubborn.     
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Livingston Survey (LS) is another option. In addition to the expectations of the business economists 
(be), the Barclays Basix survey for the UK also reports the expected inflation rates for three other 
groups of professional forecasters: academic economists (ae), financial directors (fd), and trade 
unionists (tu) (see Kelly (2008) for a detailed discussion). Hence, we also estimate model (10) using 
the other groups of professional forecasts as proxies for expectations reported in the news media. 
The results are found in columns three to five in Table 3. We obtain qualitatively similar results as 
those estimated for be. Our results are robust to alternative definitions of news media reported 
forecasts. Finally, studies using the SPF and LS tend to use the average of the individual response 
for different groups of experts and economists. So for consistency, in the last column in Table 3 
(labeled "Average"), we report the average for the four groups of professionals’ forecasts reported 
in the Barclays Basix dataset. Once again, results confirm all the findings using the be group. 
Approximately a third of the general public form their expectations absorbing the professionals’ 
forecasts perfectly, while about 60% of the general public are inattentive - of whom about half are 
‘stubborn’ and, finally,  about 10% are naïve ‘rule-of-thumbers’. 
 Finally, and on a minor note,  the GARCH estimates reported in the upper panel of Table 3 
allows us to quantify the temporal pattern of the time-varying variance of the random shocks εt  in 
model (10).5  Figure 3 below reports the temporal pattern of the conditional variance of the shocks 
to general public inflation expectations corresponding to the four alternative groups of professional 
forecasters in Table 3 and to their average. The results confirm the high variability of the random 
shocks to households’ expectations - characterized by UK’s participation in the Exchange Rate 
mechanism (ERM) regime up to 1992.  This reduces considerably since the beginning of the 
inflation targeting period. Inflation targeting began soon after UK exited the ERM and the Bank of 
England was made operationally independent in 1997.  
Figure 3 here 
                                                 
5 The GARCH(1,1) estimator of model (10) parameters assumes that the random shocks εt have a variance 2t modeled 
as: 2
12
2
110
2
  ttt  . 
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IV Concluding Remarks 
This paper investigates an important aspect of macroeconomic expectations – notably the 
microfoundations of how non-experts’ (or general public) form inflation expectations. Using a 
unique dataset we investigate the range of near rational inflation expectations.  We use an extended 
version of an important recent contribution to the literature: the epidemiological version of ‘sticky 
information expectations’ or ‘rational inattentive’ behavior. We are now able to relax some of the 
crucial assumptions made in Carroll (2003 and 2006) necessitated by data limitations. 
Consequently, we are able to disentangle more clearly the different household behavior as they 
form their inflation expectations and their respective proportion share of the population.   
 The epidemiological model divides the population into households that are rational, as 
they observe professional forecasts contemporaneously via the news media, and inattentive 
households have to rely on their past expectations which are, nevertheless, forward-looking. Our 
empirical analysis highlights three key issues. In the first instances, households are able to form 
two-period (or two-year) ahead forecasts for permanent innovations. Secondly, the general public 
who are ‘information gathers’ tend to either absorb the professionals’ inflation forecasts or form 
their inflation expectations anchoring on actual current inflation rates. Finally, and most 
importantly, inattentive households can be distinguished between those that are forward-looking 
and those that are stubborn, as they rely on lagged expectations that are just one-year ahead. We can 
conclude that approximately sixty percent of the general public are inattentive and of whom fifty 
percent are found to be ‘stubborn’.   
  In view of the present analysis, an important question is: how does it affect the ‘sticky-
information Phillips curve’ (Mankiw and Reis (2002))? Does one need to account for the proportion 
of ‘inattentive’ general public or just those that are stubborn? These issues, however, are beyond the 
scope of the present paper.  
  
 14
References 
Bollerslev, T., R. F. Engle and D. B. Nelson (1994), “ARCH Models” in R. F. Engle and D. L. 
McFadden (eds.), Handbook of Econometrics, Vol. 4, Ch. 49, Elsevier.  
Blanchflower, D. G. and R. Kelly (2008), "Macroeconomic Literacy, Numeracy and the 
Implications for Monetary Policy", Bank of England Speech, April 29th. 
Brazier, A., R. Harrison, M. King and T.Yates., (2008), “The Danger of Inflation Expectations of 
Macroeconomic Stability: Heuristic Switching in an Overlapping-Generations Monetary 
Model”. International Journal of Central Banking Vol. 4 (2), pp. 219-254.    
Carroll, C. D. (2003), Macroeconomic Expectations of Households and Professional Forecasters”, 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, February, 269-298. 
_______ (2006), “The Epidemiology of Macroeconomic Expectations” in L. Blume and S. Durlauf, 
(eds.), The Economy as an Evolving Complex System, III, Oxford University Press.   
Dickey, D. A. and W. A. Fuller (1979). “Distribution of the Estimators for Autoregressive Time 
Series with a Unit Root”, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 74, 427–431. 
Easaw, J. and R. Golinelli (2010), “Household Forming Inflation Expectations: Active and Passive 
Absorption Rates”, B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics (contributions), 10(1), article 35. 
Engle, R. F. and C. W. J. Granger (1987). “Co-integration and Error Correction: Representation, 
Estimation, and Testing”, Econometrica, 55, 251–276. 
Ivanov, V. and L. Kilian (2005), “A Practitioner’s Guide to Lag Order Selection for VAR Impulse 
Response Analysis”, Study in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics, 9(1), Article 2. 
Johansen, S. (1992), “Cointegration in Partial Systems and the Efficiency of Single-Equation 
Analysis”, Journal of Econometrics, 52, 389-402. 
_________ (1995). Likelihood-based Inference in Cointegrated Vector Autoregressive Models, 
Oxford University Press. 
Goecke, H., W.J. Luham and M.W.M. Roos (2011), "Rational Inattentiveness in the Lab: the Effect 
of Information Costs on Forecasting", TU Dortmund manuscript. 
Kelly, R., (2008), “The causal relationship between inflation and inflation expectations in the 
United Kingdom”, External MPC Unit, Bank of England, Discussion Paper, 24.  
Lanne, M. A, Luoma, A. and Luoto, J, (2009), “A Naïve Sticky Information Model of Households’ 
Inflation Expectations”, Journal of Economics Dynamics and Control, 33, 1332-1344.  
MacKinnon, J. G., A. A. Haug, and L. Michelis (1999), “Numerical Distribution Functions of 
Likelihood Ratio Tests for Cointegration”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 14, 563-577. 
 15
Mankiw, N. G., R. Reis and J. Wolfers (2004), “Disagreement about Inflation Expectations”, NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual 2003, 18, 209-270.  
 
Mankiw, N. G. and R. Reis (2002), “Sticky Information Versus Sticky Prices: A Proposal to 
Replace the New Keynesian Phillips Curve”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 1295-
1328.  
Ng, S. and P. Perron (1995), “Unit Root Test in ARIMA Models With Data Dependent Methods for 
the Selection of the Truncation Lag”, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 90, 
268-281. 
Phillips, P. C. B. and B. E. Hansen (1990), “Statistical Inference in Instrumental Variables 
Regression with I(1) Processes”, Review of Economics Studies, 57, 99-125. 
Pfajfar, D. and B. Zakelj (2009), "Experimental Evidence on Inflation Expectation Formation", 
Tilburg University Discussion Paper, No. 2009-07. 
Reis, R. (2006a), “Inattentive Consumers”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 53, pp. 1761-1800.  
______ (2006b), “Inattentive Producers”, Review of Economics Studies, 73, 793-821.   
Roberts, J., (1997), “Is Inflation Sticky?” Journal of Monetary Economics, 39, pp. 173-196.  
Roberts, J., (1998), “Inflation Expectations and the Transmission of Monetary Policy”, Federal 
Reserve Board FEDS working paper, No. 1998-43.   
 16
         Table 1 – Univariate analysis of the difference between inflation forecasts a 
General public Business economist
 gp be
Mean 0.39 0.11
Median 0.50 0.20
Maximum 0.90 0.90
Minimum -0.90 -1.20
Standard Deviation 0.40 0.50
Skewness -1.70 -0.97
Kurtosis 5.04 3.72
Jarque-Bera, p-value 0.0000 0.0014
ADF statistic b -2.10 -2.55
p-value 0.2453 0.1084
Autocorrelation c 
- Levels, lag: 
1 0.901 0.839
2 0.757 0.684
3 0.636 0.576
4 0.560 0.440
8 0.209 -0.004
12 -0.054 -0.218
- First differences, lag:   
1 0.267 -0.001
2 -0.069 -0.153
3 -0.244 0.107
4 -0.272 -0.060
8 0.015 -0.079
12 0.053 0.056
(a) Differences are between two- and one-year ahead forecasts. 
(b) Dickey and Fuller (1979) test with truncation lags set by MAIC (Modified AIC) selection 
rule of Ng and Perron (2001).  
(c) Asymptotic standard error (lag>0):  0.118. 
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       Table 2 – Estimation results of model (8) a 
OLS GARCH FM-OLS CVAR
1  0.3725 0.3394 0.2237 0.32850.0651 0.0806 0.0886 0.0607
2  0.4370 0.5148 0.6220 0.47580.0891 0.1076 0.1274 0.1196
3  0.2487 0.2262 0.2485 0.23650.0474 0.0569 0.0618 0.0441
Intercept 0.3165 0.0716 -0.1174 0.01150.2937 0.3545 0.4045 0.1679
  
321    1.0582 1.0805 1.0941 1.04080.0487 0.0599 0.0639 –
Diagnostics tests:   
Cointegration, p-value b, c 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0035
Weak exogeneity, p-value d  0.9005
Durbin Watson residuals’ autocorrelation 1.48 1.57 1.70 1.93
(a) In bold, parameter estimates and, below, their standard errors. Estimation methods: OLS = Ordinary 
Least Squares; GARCH = GARCH(1,1), see Bollerslev et al. (1994); FM-OLS = Fully-Modified OLS, see 
Phillips and Hansen (1990); CVAR = Cointegrated VAR, see Johansen (1992 and 1995). 
(b) In the first three columns, residual-based Engle and Granger (1997) test (truncation lags of the unit-root 
test equation are MAIC-selected, see Ng and Perron, 2001). In the fourth column, Johansen’s trace rank test 
in a VAR(1) with constant restricted to lie in the cointegration space and conditional on the most recently 
known actual inflation in t and t-1; the VAR order is selected on the basis of Schwarz Information Criterion, 
see Ivanov and Kilian (2005). All the following  tests for rank  1 are never rejected. The p-value of the null 
hypothesis that rank = 0 in a VAR(1) model without conditioning inflation series is 0.001.  
(c) MacKinnon et al (1999) p-values. 
(d) Test for the weakly exogeneity of business economists’ forecast series in making inferences on the 
cointegrating relationship and the loading parameters, see Johansen (1992 and 1995). The p-value of the 
weak exogeneity test in a VAR(1) without conditioning inflation is 0.3935. 
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       Table 3 – Estimation results of model (10) a 
groups definition:b be be ae fd tu Average
ex ante restrictions: φ=0 none 
Estimation method: OLS with GARCH (1,1) errors 
1  0.3314 0.2976 0.3650 0.3400 0.2526 0.33460.0789 0.0552 0.0623 0.0620 0.0647 0.0628
2  0.5365 0.6211 0.6444 0.6422 0.7120 0.63670.0358 0.0408 0.0436 0.0440 0.0438 0.0429
  0.4567 0.4388 0.5467 0.5763 0.4975
0.1464 0.1653 0.1556 0.1518 0.1588
3  0.2221 0.1630 0.0656 0.0906 0.0682 0.09890.0389 0.0385 0.0418 0.0433 0.0476 0.0441
321    1.0900 1.0817 1.0750 1.0729 1.0329 1.07020.0519 0.0452 0.0489 0.0504 0.0517 0.0504
Durbin Watson test 1.6031 1.7467 1.8748 1.7289 1.7227 1.7557
Autocorrelation (p-values) 
- 1st order 0.1000 0.3820 0.5000 0.2120 0.4210 0.3640
- 4th order 0.1050 0.7300 0.5120 0.1910 0.2000 0.2250
- 8th order 0.1890 0.7290 0.3850 0.1020 0.1850 0.2010
Heteroskedasticity (p-values) 
- 1st order 0.6000 0.3520 0.7250 0.4060 0.2530 0.4380
- 4th order 0.6690 0.2640 0.6970 0.0770 0.2080 0.3230
- 8th order 0.3210 0.2600 0.6200 0.0580 0.4630 0.2620
Estimation method: Cointegrated VAR  
1  0.3419 0.3831 0.4406 0.4551 0.3898 0.43530.0417 0.0879 0.0880 0.0941 0.0757 0.0820
2  0.4474 0.5781 0.5623 0.5641 0.5727 0.55700.1141 0.1100 0.1016 0.1070 0.1113 0.1049
  0.0000 0.4303 0.2552 0.4492 0.2982 0.3225
0.2051 0.0817 0.2252 0.1120 0.1296
3  0.2286 0.1469 0.0883 0.0809 0.0947 0.09970.0528 0.0457 0.0458 0.0470 0.0482 0.0464
321    1.0179 1.1082 1.0912 1.1001 1.0572 1.0921
Cointegration rank=0  c 0.0071 0.0071 0.0035 0.0057 0.0039 0.0063
Cointegration rank=1  c 0.8022 0.8022 0.7645 0.6293 0.5049 0.7836
Weak exogeneity test  d 0.8587 0.1731 0.2187 0.2695 0.1200 0.1936
(a) In bold, parameter estimates and, below, their standard errors. Estimation methods: GARCH(1,1), see 
Bollerslev et al. (1994); Cointegrated VAR, see Johansen (1992 and 1995). 
(b) Groups of professional forecasters: business economists (be), academic economists (ae), financial directors 
(fd), trade unionists (tu). "Average" is the mean of all four previous groups. 
(c) P-values of Johansen’s trace rank test in a VAR(1) without constant and conditional on the most recently 
known actual inflation in t and t-1; the VAR order is selected on the basis of Schwarz Information Criterion, 
see Ivanov and Kilian (2005).  
 (d) P-values of the tests for the weakly exogeneity of professionals’ forecast series in making inferences on 
the cointegrating relationship and the loading parameters, see Johansen (1992 and 1995).  
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  Figure 1 – Difference between two- and one-year ahead inflation forecasts a 
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(a) gp = general public; be = business economists.  
 
 
 
  Figure 2 – The Forecastsa 
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(a) gp = general public; be = business economists. 1yr = one-year ahead; 2yrs = two-
years ahead forecasts. 
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Figure 3 – Conditional variance of model (10) GARCH estimates a 
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(a) Computed by measuring professional forecasts with alternative groups: business economists 
(be), academic economists (ae), financial directors (fd), trade unionists (tu). "average" is the 
mean of all four previous groups. 
 
 
